
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
The Cyclical Volatility of Labor Markets under 
Frictional Financial Markets




The Cyclical Volatility of Labor Markets 





















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 















Financial frictions are known to raise the volatility of economies to shocks (e.g. Bernanke and 
Gertler 1989). We follow this line of research to the labor literature concerned by the volatility 
of labor market outcomes to productivity shocks initiated by Shimer (2005): in an economy 
with search on credit and labor markets, a financial multiplier raises the elasticity of labor 
market tightness to productivity shocks. This multiplier increases with total financial costs and 
is minimized under a credit market Hosios-Pissarides rule. Using a flexible calibration method 
based on small perturbations, we find the parameter values to match the US share of the 
financial sector. Those values are far away from Hosios and lead to a financial accelerator of 
about 3.6 (exogenous wages) to 4.5 (endogenous wages). Both match Shimer (2005)’s 
elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. Financial frictions are thus an 
alternative to the “small labor surplus” assumption in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008): we 
keep the value of wages over productivity below 0.78. We conclude that financial frictions are 
a good candidate to solve the volatility puzzle and rejoin Pissarides (2009) in arguing that 
hiring costs must be partly non-proportional to congestion in the labor market, which is the 
case of financial costs. 
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Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer (2005) have investigated the cyclical properties of the search
matching models following Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The celebrated
Shimer’s puzzle is the demonstration of the inability of the conventional matching model to replicate
the US statistics regarding the volatility of job vacancies, unemployment and their ratio (called labor
market tightness), in response to productivity shocks. Shimer’s main ﬁnding is that the elasticity of
labor market tightness to productivity shocks is around 20 in the data, and around 1 in a calibration of
the Mortensen-Pissarides model. Several calibration improvements have been proposed. One of them,
called the “small labor surplus” assumption, implies that the calibrated value of non-employment utility
(Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008) becomes closer to market productivity, with only a few percentage
points differences and very low values for the bargaining power of workers. This leads ﬁrms to also face
a small surplus, of a few percentage points, after bargaining over the surplus. Firms are therefore more
fragiletoproductivityshocks, leadingthemarkettobeoverallmorevolatile. Otherpromisingroadshave
been proposed, such as wage rigidity (Hall 2005) and on-the-job search (Mortensen and Nagypàl 2007).
The latter paper also makes the point that a large part of ﬂuctuations in the unemployment/vacancy ratio
is not due to productivity shocks. Since the partial correlation between tightness and productivity is
around 40%, a lower value of the elasticity (approximately 7), needs to be matched. Pissarides (2009)
retains a value of 7.56.1
One line of research that has so far been ignored but seems promising is the existence of credit
market imperfections. Indeed, it has been known for a while that credit market imperfections generate
additional volatility of the business cycle. Early papers such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and subsequent papers (such as Bernanke and Gertler 1995, Bernanke Gertler and
Gilchrist 1996, and several others), have emphasized the ampliﬁcation role of credit markets and the
existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator. Although part of this literature is centered on the role of credit
shocks and the credit channel of monetary policy, the ingredients generating the ampliﬁcation of credit
shocks can very well be adapted to the ampliﬁcation of business cycle shocks to labor markets.
In this paper we pursue this logic, in providing a dynamic extension of Wasmer and Weil (2004),
who develop ﬁnancial imperfections in a Mortensen-Pissarides economy with two matching functions
(one in the labor market, one in the credit market). Firms arise from the result of the meeting of an
1See Pissarides (2009) page 1351, footnote 15.
2entrepreneur and a banker on a frictional credit market. The average cost of creating a ﬁrm is the sum
of all prospecting costs on the credit market which, compared to the world with perfect credit markets
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), imposes a lower limit on the value of a job vacancy to a ﬁrm.
Our results regarding the ampliﬁcation of productivity shocks in this double matching economy can
be summarized as follows. Consistent with Wasmer and Weil (2004) in a static context, ﬁnancial im-
perfections raise the calibrated elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. We denote by
MD
f the dynamic ﬁnancial accelerator (or hereafter, dynamic ﬁnancial multiplier), which is an increasing
function of total ﬁnancial costs in the economy. This paper brings in addition several new results.
First, a Hosios-Pissarides rule exists in the credit market: the bargaining power of ﬁrms vis-à-vis
banks is equal, at the social optimum, to the elasticity of the ﬁnding rate of banks with respect to credit
market tightness. Under the Hosios rule, the search costs in the credit market are minimized, and so is
the ﬁnancial multiplier. Relaxing that condition leads to a larger ﬁnancial multiplier, which can match
or even overshoot the elasticity of market tightness in the data.
Second, using a ﬂexible calibration method based on small perturbations (a trembling-hand cali-
bration method), we ﬁnd the parameter values that allow us to match the share of the ﬁnancial sector
in GDP in the US (3.3%), as well as much larger elasticities of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks. The parameter values are generally far away from Hosios.
Third, with endogenous wages, we obtain a ﬁnancial multiplier of 2.9 and an elasticity of labor
market tightness to productivity shocks of 7 when bank’s share of the surplus with the ﬁrm is 0.91 and
the elasticity of the ﬁnding rate of banks with respect to credit market tightness is 0.55.
Fourth, this result is obtained keeping the share of wages to be around 0.78 of productivity and a
bargaining share of workers of 0.10, thus quite far away from the “small labor surplus” assumption in
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Financial frictions are thus an alternative to be taken seriously. As
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) point out, the small labor surplus assumption implies that there is very
little utility gain to accepting a job, nor does it ﬁt well with estimates of the value of non-employment.
Financial imperfections in our model enable us to partly relax this assumption in order to match the
elasticity of market tightness to productivity found in the data.
Fifth, to obtain an elasticity of 20, we need a ﬁnancial multiplier of 4.6 and for that, we need to
reduce the bargaining power of workers over wages to 0.03, thus to a value close from Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). Note however that we still keep the value of wages over productivity at 0.78.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we calculate the volatility of labor market tightness
3to productivity shocks and show how the Hosios rule in the credit market affects the volatility of the
labor market. In Section 3, we describe the stochastic extension of the model, with both endogenous and
exogenous wages. In Section 4, we describe our calibration method. In Section 5, we derive our main
results : deviating away from Hosios substantially raises the elasticity of labor market tightness with
exogenous wages. The calibration with endogenous wages shows similar results. In addition, the “small
labor surplus” assumption does not need to be maintained. In Section 6, we conclude that ﬁnancial
frictions are a good candidate to solve the volatility puzzle and rejoin Pissarides (2009) in arguing that
hiring costs must be partly non-proportional to congestion in the labor market, which is the case of
ﬁnancial costs. We also suggest how to improve the calibration by extending ﬁnancial imperfection to
operating ﬁrms, along the lines of Petrosky-Nadeau (2009) who shows that in a costly state veriﬁcation
model with search, an ampliﬁcation of the volatility of labor market tightness arises by a factor of 3.5.
2 Hosios-Pissarides in a continuous time economy with credit and labor
market frictions and the elasticity of labor market tightness to shocks
2.1 Model
Time is continuous and there are three types of agents: entrepreneurs with no capital; banks with no
ability to produce; and workers with no capital and no ability to start a business. The timing of events
for entrepreneurs is as follows. They initially need to ﬁnd a "banker" in order to start a business. This
search process costs e units of effort per unit of time. Search is successful with probability p. The newly
formed ﬁrm, from the successful meeting of entrepreneur and banker, then goes to the labor market.
The bank ﬁnances the vacancy posting cost g to attract workers (the so-called recruitment costs) for the
ﬁrm. This search process succeeds with probability q. The ﬁrm is then able to produce and sell in the
good market, which generates a ﬂow proﬁt y w r where y is the marginal product, w is the wage, r
is the ﬂow rate of discount, and r is the ﬂow repayment to the bank (determined through bargaining).
Jobs are subject to destruction shocks with Poisson parameter s. The steady-state asset values of the
entrepreneurs are denoted by Ej with j = c;l or g the market in which the entrepreneur is operating,
standing respectively for the credit, labor and good markets. We also assume free entry at the ﬁrst stage,
4that is Ec  0. We therefore have the following Bellman equations:
rEc = 0 =  e+ pEl (1)
rEl = 0+q(Eg El) (2)
rEg = y w r +s(0 E). (3)
In the last line, it was assumed that job destruction also leads to the destruction of the ﬁrm and the
lending relation with the bank.
Symmetrically, the bank’s asset values are denoted by Bj, j = c;l or g for each of the stages. We
also assume free entry of the banking relationship: Bc = 0. We denote by k the screening cost per unit
of time of banks in the ﬁrst stage, and by b p the Poisson rate at which a bank ﬁnds a ﬁrm to be ﬁnanced.
We have:
rBc = 0 =  k + b pBl (4)
rBl =  g +q(Bg Bl) (5)
rBg = r +s(0 Bg). (6)
The matching rates p and b p are made mutually consistent by the existence of a matching function
Mc(B;E), where B and E are respectively the number of bankers and of entrepreneurs in stage c. This
function is assumed to have constant returns to scale. Hence, denoting by f the ratio E/B, which is a
reﬂection of the tension in the credit market and that we shall call credit market tightness from the point




= p(f) with p0(f) < 0.
b p = fp(f) with b p0(f) > 0.
After the contact, the bank and the entrepreneur engage in bargaining about r which is such that
(1 b)Bl = bEl (7)
5where b is the bargaining power of the bank relative to the entrepreneur. With b = 0 the bank leaves all
the surplus to the entrepreneur.







Matching in the labor market is denoted by Ml(V ;u) where u is the rate of unemployment and the total
number of unemployed workers since the labor force is normalized to 1. V is the number of "vacancies",
that is the number of ﬁrms in stage l. The function is also assumed to be constant return to scale, hence





with q0(q) < 0.






































Each equation provides a link between q and f that is of opposite sign. There is therefore at most
one equilibrium set of (q;f).2 Finally, summing up (EE) and (BB), one obtains a single market


















where the left-hand side is a measure of the total amount of search costs in ﬁnancial markets. These are
2Wasmer and Weil (2004) provide a condition for existence.








2.2 Steady-state volatility of q to shocks
For the moment, to keep the analysis simple, we ﬁx wages at some exogenous value. Endogenous wages
are introduced only in the stochastic extension, in next Section. We now want to calculate the elasticity







The value of qP deﬁned here is the credit frictionless world in Pissarides (1985), which one would












Hence, given that q0 is downward sloping, we have that q < qP , as was shown in Wasmer and Weil
(2004) and arises in Petrosky-Nadeau (2009), and the difference is precisely due to the existence of
search costs in the credit market. Posing r = 0 to marginally simplify the analysis, we have an equilib-
rium job creation condition under frictional credit markets which states that the proﬁt ﬂows from a job







The presence of frictional credit markets adds a new component in the entry costs for ﬁrms that, in the
special case r = 0, is independent of labor market tightness. As we will see, this will raise the volatility
of the economy, an insight already brought by Pissarides (2009).3
Let p = (y w)=(r+s) be the present discounted value of proﬁts. Taking logs and differentiating,
3A stated in Pissarides (2009, page 1341) : “(...) a simple remodeling of the [matching] costs from proportional to
partly ﬁxed and partly proportional can increase the volatility of tightness and job ﬁnding, virtually matching the observed











or, reusing (12) and (13) and where h =  q0(q)q=q(q) is the (non-necessarily constant) elasticity of q
















Two remarks are in order. First, in the (credit) frictionless world in Pissarides, the elasticity is simply
the inverse of the elasticity of q to q, that is 1/h. Second, the existence of credit market imperfections
reduces q relative to qP, and therefore raise the volatility Lq=p by a factor due to the ﬁnancial multiplier
identiﬁed in Wasmer and Weil (2004): higher proﬁts raise the entry of ﬁrms, hence banks make faster





the value of the ﬁnancial multiplier where the superscript S reﬂects that this is calculated in a static
context. The multiplier can more generically be deﬁned as the ratio of the elasticity in a world with
credit frictions and the elasticity in a world where credit frictions disappear.
Under the assumption of an exogenous wage, the response of this economy to productivity shocks
















The ﬁrst component of this elasticity is the ampliﬁcation due to the existence of search frictions on the
labor market. The second component is the gap between wages and marginal product - the smaller the
gap, the more responsive job creation is to productivity shocks; and ﬁnally, the third is the ﬁnancial
multiplier.
The labor literature has attempted to raise the elasticity of market tightness to productivity with
either wage rigidities (Hall 2005) or by making what we will call hereafter the "small labor surplus"
assumption by choosing higher values of non-employment utility and lower values for the bargaining
power of workers (Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008), reducing the gap between wages and marginal
product. While acknowledging the interest of these approaches, we pursue another avenue here and
attempt to understand the determinants of MS
f.
82.3 Hosios-Pissarides in the credit market and the entry costs for ﬁrms
We start by noting that frictions in the credit market may lead to a second best efﬁciency condition
similar to that in Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (1990).
2.3.1 The efﬁciency of ﬁnancial markets in a search-economy
To see this, we can calculate the social welfare function as output net of all search costs. We have :
W = y(1 u)+zu gqu kB eE
where z is the value of non-employment utility and qu = V is the number of ﬁrms prospecting in
the labor market. To obtain a simpler expression for W, we can note that in a steady-state, we have
E p(f) = q(q)V which states that inﬂows into the ﬁnancing stage are compensated by outﬂows out of






















s.t. u = s=(s+qq(q))
Relative to the choice of the optimal f denoted by fopt, the problem is simple and block-recursive in f
and then in u and q. For the ﬁrst block that we only consider here, the optimal choice of f amounts to














where e =  
fp0(f)
p(f)























search costs on credit markets. The Hosios-Pissarides rule, which states that there is a value of the
bargaining parameter over r that internalizes the matching externalities due to the search frictions,
applies here :
f = fopt
, b = e : Hosios condition in the credit market
2.3.2 Minimizing the ﬁnancial costs and the gap between q and qP
One may think that the Hosios condition is the one that minimizes entry costs in the credit market.
One can check this formally. The left-hand side of job creation condition (CC) is a function of b
and e denoted by K(b;e) ; the right-hand side is increasing in q. It is therefore enough to show that






















, e = b
Given that MS
f, and hence Lq=y; is increasing in the gap between q and qP, at any f, the Hosios
condition in the credit market is the one minimizing the volatility induced by ﬁnancial imperfections.
The calibration in Wasmer and Weil (2004) thus implied a minimized ﬁnancial multiplier of MS
f = 1:74
by setting b = e. Away from this equation, one has a larger ﬁnancial multiplier.
3 A stochastic extension
3.1 Dynamic setup
In this Section, we study a dynamic stochastic model with ﬁrst exogenous and then endogenous wages,
and offer a ﬂexible – that is, easy-to-implement– calibration method to obtain both a set of ﬁrst order
10moments (unemployment and ﬁnancial sector’s share of GDP) and then second moments (the volatility
of labor market tightness to productivity shocks).
We make the following assumptions for convenience. First, time is discrete and labor productivity
is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process yt = ryyt 1 +nt, where 0 < ry < 1 and nt is white
noise. Second, we relax the assumption that r = 0. Third, an entrepreneur meeting a banker begins the
recruiting process within the period. A successful meeting between a ﬁrm and worker begins production
the following period. Maintaining our assumption of free entry on both sides of the credit market and
bargaining over r; we ﬁnd that the equilibrium credit market tightness f is time invariant and of the
same form as earlier.5 Moreover, r is assumed to be determined when a banker and an entrepreneur
meet and is solved as









where Et is an expectations operator over productivity and wt is a wage determined later on.
From the constant values of being in the recruiting stage, Bl;t = k
fp(f) and El;t = e
p(f), we can














































are vacancy costs augmented for frictional credit markets and K = e
p(f) + k
fp(f) is once again total
search costs on the credit market.
It is worth noting two special cases. First, when r = 0 , Gt is simply the sum of all prospection costs














which indicates that set-up costs of ﬁrms now include a part unrelated to labor market tightness, with
therefore a potential for raising volatility as setup costs will be less procyclical. Second, when credit















3.2 Elasticity of qt to productivity shocks, ﬁxed wage
Deﬁne period proﬁts from labor as Pt = yt  w where wt =w is a ﬁxed wage. We can compute two
elasticities of labor market tightness to productivity innovations, ﬁrst in the absence of ﬁnancial imper-
fections, second with ﬁnancial imperfections, and compare them.
























y nt such that
the elasticity of market tightness to a productivity shock in the Pissarides world with a ﬁxed wage is
























> g(0) = g is a measure of total frictional costs in both credit and labor
markets.










which boils down to the static ﬁnancial multiplier MS
f derived in Section 2 when r = 0: We thus provide
here a dynamic generalization of this multiplier.
3.3 Elasticity of qt to productivity shocks, endogenous wages
Endogenous wages strongly reduce the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. We
thus expect that the ﬁnancial multiplier will need to be higher to generate the volatility obtained in the
economy with a ﬁxed wage.
The wage determination we select is as follows. We assume that the worker bargains the wage with
a ﬁrm, deﬁned as the entrepreneur-banker block, at the time of meeting, instead of a bilateral bargaining
between the worker and the entrepreneur (leaving the bank aside).6
Deﬁne the values of employment and unemployment in a discrete time stochastic setting as
Ut = z+ f(qt)bEtWt+1+(1  f(qt))bEtUt+1
Wt = wt +bEt [(1 s)Wt+1+sUt+1]
where z is the value of non-employment activities and f(q) = qq(q) the job ﬁnding rate. The Pis-






+(1 a)z where a is the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis the
ﬁrm. Taking log-deviations, movements in labor market tightness to future productivity in the credit
















h(1+r) reﬂects the share of the change in productivity accruing
6There are two related reasons for this choice. The ﬁrst one is that the natural alternative, bargaining between the en-
trepreneur and the worker, leads to complex strategic interactions illustrated in Wasmer and Weil (2004, Section IV-A): the
entrepreneur and the bank wish to raise the debt of the ﬁrm above what is needed in order to reduce the size of total surplus to
be shared between the ﬁrm and the worker at a later time. Hence, wages are driven down to the reservation wage of workers
and do not vary with the ﬁrm’s productivity, which is counterfactual. This leads to the second reason, which is that we want our
endogenous wage extension to be comparable to the classical wage solution in the labor search literature in order to compare
the volatility in the model to other elasticities found in the literature.
13to the worker through the wage. The latter strongly reduces the elasticity of labor market tightness to









Compared to the elasticity when wages are ﬁxed, only a share (1 a) of the rise in productivity accrues
to the ﬁrm. In addition, the equilibrium rise in labor market tightness following a positive productivity
shock improves the outside option of the worker and his bargaining position in the wage determination.
This appears in the denominator as the term a f(qP); further reducing the elasticity of labor market
tightness to productivity shocks.
Turning now to the responsiveness of labor market tightness under frictional credit markets, we
begin by detailing the determination of the wage. As discussed earlier, we assume that the wage is
negotiated in a worker-ﬁrm pair and, in the presence of credit market frictions, it must satisfy a sharing
rule aFg;t = (1 a)(Wt  Ut), where Fg;t = Eg;t +Bg;t is the joint value of the ﬁrm to the entrepreneur-
banker pair. Under this assumption the wage is
wt = a[yt +Gtq
t ]+(1 a)z
and differs from the Pissarides wage by the coefﬁcient Gt on market tightness. To the extent that this
term is negatively correlated with productivity, credit market frictions induce a certain degree of wage
rigidity by limiting the effect of a rise in market tightness on wages, a feature also present in Petrosky-







costs augmented for frictional credit markets. Since q is decreasing in market tightness, so is G. This
effect, however, will be marginal in the quantitative results.








hgT(1+r) [hgT(1 d) a f(q)(gT +(1 h)e k)]ry
(23)
where e k  K
q(q)
1+r . The dynamic ﬁnancial multiplier is then equal to
7To check the result, note that if ry = 1 this is the elasticity obtained when comparing steady states, or to a permanent

























and we provide here a generalization of the static multiplier in Wasmer and Weil (2004) along two
dimensions: stochastic dynamics and endogenous wages.
4 Calibration
4.1 Targets: ﬁrst and second moments
Our ﬁrst objective is to ﬁnd a precise measure of the share of the ﬁnancial sector in GDP and try to
reproduce it in the steady-state of the model’s stochastic extension. Theoretically, the share of the
ﬁnancial sector in the value added is
S =
(1 u)r  V g  Bk
1 u
(25)
where in the numerator, the ﬁrst term represents total bank gross proﬁts r times the number of banks in
the proﬁt state, which is equal to the number of ﬁrms 1 u; the second term represents the negative cash
ﬂows of banks ﬁnancing vacancies times the number of job vacancies V , where V = qu ; and the last
term represents the ﬁnancial intermediation costs paid by banks. Note that we assumed the costs e paid
by entrepreneurs don’t enter GDP as they are effort costs. The denominator is total production at y = 1.
US national economic accounts data (various tables in the NIPA8) allow us to calculate the gross
value added of ﬁnancial services. For that, we use one of the seven components of value added entitled
ﬁnancialbusiness grossvalue added, from whichwe subtract, from theexpenditure account, Households
Consumption on Expenditures in Insurance and Financial Services. Over the period 1985-2008, this
represents approximately 3.0% of GDP and will be the target for S. Our second target for ﬁrst moments
will be the rate of unemployment that we try to keep in the neighborhood of 7%. Our third target is to
ﬁnd an elasticity of q to productivity shocks around 20.
Our approach can be summarized in three stages, described in the following sub-sections.
8e.g. http://www.econstats.com/nipa/NIPA1_1_14_.htm
154.2 Initial values of parameters under Hosios-Pissarides
We ﬁrst ﬁnd, both for the ﬁxed wage model and the endogenous wage model, a set of parameters
that reaches the target unemployment level. The calibration of the credit market requires choosing
parameters of the credit matching function, assumed to be of the form Mc(B;E) = VE 1 eBe, the costs
of prospecting on credit markets and the bargaining weight b: We start agnostically from a Hosios-
Pissarides rule in the credit market and proceed as follows.
We start from an initial, informed guess on parameters, where we choose in particular a symmetric
set of parameters regarding prospecting costs and the matching function in the credit market. We include
theses parameters in a vector X using as a starting point a "balanced" credit matching function and the
credit market Hosios condition; i.e., b = e = 0:5, symmetry in prospecting costs k = e = 0:05 and set
the remaining parameter, V, to 0.05. On the labor market, we include the unit recruitment costs of g
and the level parameter c of the matching function Ml(V ;u) = cV 1 huh in the vector of parameters
X to achieve a desired level of unemployment. For the exogenous wage speciﬁcation it is assumed
to equal three quarters of labor productivity. The steady state rate of job separation is set to s = 0:06,
corresponding to the value reported in Davis et al. (2006). We assume an elasticity of the labor matching
function with respect to unemployment of h = 0:5 9 and, with endogenous wages, we set the ﬂow value
of non-employment z = 0:4 as suggested by Shimer (2005). Finally, the risk free rate is set to 4%
annually, corresponding to a 3-month treasury bill, and the persistence coefﬁcient in the process for
productivity is set to 0.975, a commonly used value in the real business cycle literature.
In this initial calibration, the value of S (share of ﬁnancial sector in GDP in equation 25) happens
to be too low and relatively stable to parameters. The parameter space is large and it is difﬁcult to
ﬁnd the “right” parameter values. For example, the natural idea of raising screening costs k does not
raise sufﬁciently the share of the ﬁnancial sector because the free-entry condition reduces the number
of banks entering, so that S remains fairly constant. Raising b reduces instead the number of ﬁrms and
thus affect the value of unemployment.
9See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of estimates of the labor matching function.
164.3 A “trembling hand” calibration method
We will therefore propose a transparent calibration method, inspired from the “simulated annealing
method.”10The procedure consists of perturbing each element of an initial vector of parameters X by a
random shock drawn for a normal distribution in a 7-dimensional parameter space for exogenous wages:
g;b,e;e;k and the two scale parameters in the matching functions denoted by c in the labor market and
V in the credit market. With endogenous wages, the parameter space is 8-dimensional with the inclusion
of the worker’s bargaining weight a.
We run perturbations of the set of parameters X in a neighborhood of the starting values of parame-
ters, where perturbations are small : each parameter receives a multiplicative normal shock of variance
1/60 (exogenous wages) or 1/80 (endogenous wages). We obtain a corresponding value of the equilib-
rium variables q, u and f as well as a value of the credit market share in GDP S. We only retain values
of the parameters for which u is between 7 and 8% and for which q(q) is between 0 and 1. After we
reach 100 “acceptable” draws, we pick up the set of parameters where S is maximal and denote the
corresponding new vector of parameters X0.
We then iterate on the same procedure, where the initial value of parameters is X0 of the previous
iteration. We stop the iterations when the value of S exceeds 3.0%, generally slightly above this thresh-
old. The convergence occurs relatively fast, in about 10 to 20 steps. We call this ﬁrst procedure Step 1,
and it aims at matching the credit market share in GDP S. Given that we have an underidentiﬁed system,
since there are several new parameters compared to traditional calibrations, in particular b,e;e;k, we
believe that our method is a fairly transparent one, more transparent than using a GMM method where
the multiplicity of parameters would leave a lot of discretion.
Next, we replicate this procedure to progressively raise the elasticity of tightness of the labor market
to productivity shocks. In particular, with endogenous wages, we also shock the bargaining power of
workers and the value of leisure. We stop when we obtain an elasticity L of labor market tightness to
productivity shocks larger than, respectively, 7, 15 and 20 in the case of endogenous wages, since the
ﬁrst one corresponds to the value suggested by Pissarides (2009), but also show that it is possible to
obtain an elasticity of 20 without making the small labor surplus assumption.
10The difference between this method and ours is that the annealing method accepts all perturbation raising an objective
function, but also accepts some perturbations reducing the objective function, with a probability which is exponential in the
variation. Ourmethod, asexplainedbelow, poolsalargenumberofperturbationsandchoosestheonemaximizingthecriterion.
175 Results of the calibration
5.1 Endogenous wages
Table1summarizesthebaselineparametervalues, boththestartingpointandtheresultsofthenumerical
search procedure. It also presents the steady state values of a series of endogenous quantities that are
part of the constraint set. The ﬁrst process, matching the share of the credit market, is stopped after 19
iterations. The values of the credit matching function’s elasticity e and the bargaining weight b evolve
quite smoothly at each iteration, as seen in Figure 1 of the appendix. Both parameters start at 0.5 and
the model diverges away from Hosios-Pissarides: the matching elasticity remains around 0.5 while the
bank bargaining weight b increases to 0.78. Note also the all other parameters included in the vector X
change very little during this procedure.
Although value of S is matched, the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks is
still low, with a value of 4.47 and a credit multiplier of 2.30. We thus launch the second step in the
calibration procedure that aims at raising the value this elasticity, keeping the value of S below 3.1%.
We reach the values 7, 15 and 20 (respectively in the columns labeled 2a, 2b and 2c) in a few iterations
(56 iterations for the last case) and the ﬁnancial multiplier reaches a factor of 4.6. During this second
step we deviate marginally more away from Hosios : b reaches 0.92 and e is still approximately 0.5.
The appendix plots the evolution of all the parameters in the vector X and shows that they all converge
quickly to their ﬁnal values reported in Table 1. The duration of search for credit is a also reduced to a
year when the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity is large enough (columns 2b and 2c).
Most other parameter values remain stable. In particular, the value of the bargaining parameter of
workers a remains at 0.10, a value that is in line with recent papers, when we target the elasticity of
labor market tightness suggested by Pissarides (2009).11
Finally, we calculate the elasticity of unemployment to unemployment beneﬁts. In Costain and
Reiter (2008), this elasticity was around 14.3 for the Hagedorn and Manovskii calibration, therefore
leading to the criticism that it is difﬁcult to match both the elasticity of labor market tightness to pro-
ductivity and the elasticity of unemployment to policy variables such as the replacement ratio. What we
show here is that, at an elasticity of 20, we can reduce the elasticity of unemployment to z 6.8.
11Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) ﬁnd a bargaining power of low skilled workers in this range, and Delacroix (2006)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 summarizes the results from the equivalent procedure for ﬁxed wages. The process of Step
1 is stopped after 10 iterations. Again, the values of the credit matching function’s elasticity e and
the bargaining weight b evolve quite smoothly at each iteration. The model also diverges away from
Hosios-Pissarides and the bank bargaining weight b increases to 0.85. The value of S is matched, but
the elasticity of tightness to productivity innovations is still a bit low, with a value of 19.5 and a credit
multiplier of 3.07. We thus launch the second step calibration procedure that aims at raising the value the
elasticity, keeping the value of S below 3.1%. We end up fast to the required value of 20, overshooting
a little at 23. The ﬁnancial multiplier reaches 3.64, deviating marginally more away from Hosios: b













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Financial imperfections raise the calibrated elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks
by a factor Mf called the ﬁnancial multiplier. With exogenous wages, it is easy to generate a plausible
large elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks, if one relaxes the Hosios-Pissarides rule
in the credit market. Under the assumption of a large enough difference between the bargaining power
of banks vis-à-vis entrepreneurs (b) with the elasticity of the rate at which entrepreneurs meet bankers
with respect to credit market tightness (e), one can obtain an elasticity around 20 or even larger.
Under endogenous wages with bargaining power a of workers relative to ﬁrms, deﬁned as the joint
bank-entrepreneur entity, all elasticities are divided by a factor 4 to 5, as was established by Shimer
(2005) and Hall (2005). Hence, the model requires a higher ﬁnancial multiplier. However we manage
to keep the wage/productivity ratio around 0.78, thus relaxing the “small labor surplus assumption” and
obtain large values of the elasticity, ranging from 7 when the bargaining power of workers over wages
is 0.10 to 21 when it is allowed to go down to 0.03.
Our results are in fact a generalization of the “small labor surplus” assumption: when the credit
market is either very tight or very slack for ﬁrms, one side of the market has a very small total surplus to
entering the relationship. Consequently, the entry of that side of the credit market is restricted and even
small productivity shocks can generate large relative increases in the number of agents on the restricted
side of the market. Here, the small surplus is on ﬁrms in the credit-prospection stage.
In addition, we can go back to the intuitions of equation (13) or its discrete time equivalents com-
bined in (15) and (17). These entry equations for ﬁrms have a common denominator: they introduce
a new element to hiring costs, which is not strictly proportional to the duration of a vacancy 1=q(q).
As pointed out in Pissarides (2009), this leads to a greater volatility. An interpretation of our paper,
fully consistent with Pissarides (2009), is that this non-proportional part is a ﬁnancial cost arising from
frictions in the credit market. Our paper thus provides a set of parameters allowing for an interpretation
of this ﬁxed part in entry costs, linked to ﬁnancial market imperfections.
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24Appendix: The Cyclical Volatility of Labor Markets under
Frictional Financial Markets
A Introduction
This appendix details the derivation of the various equations and elasticities presented in the main text.
We begin by fully describing the stochastic model in discrete time.
A.1 Asset values of an entrepreneur












The cost of convincing a bank to fund future negative cash ﬂows is e, and with probability 0 < pt < 1
this results in a successful match within the period. During the second stage, the bank covers the cost of
recruiting a worker, g, who is met with probability 0 < qt < 1. During the production stage, y goods are
produced which must cover both the wage rate w and interest payments r. During the last stage, ﬁrms
are subject to death shocks with probability s.
An assumption of free entry for entrepreneurs leads e
pt = El;t such that the ﬁnal stage may be sim-
pliﬁed to




A.2 Matching on credit markets
We follow the matching literature and assume that the total number of matches is governed by a match-
ing technology associating the total number of banks in stage 0, denoted by B, and the total number of
entrepreneurs in stage 0, denoted by E. Let MC(E;B) be the matching process in the credit market. We
have that p = MC(E;B)=E. Symmetrically, the rate at which banks ﬁnd a project they are willing to
ﬁnance is MC(E;B)=B = fp where f = E=B. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale of
25MC(E;B), we have that p = p(f) with p0(f) < 0, elasticity e(f) =  fp0(f)=p(f), and it follows that







The ﬁrst line states that in the relative scarcity of competing ﬁrms relative to banks, matching with a
banker is instantaneous, and the second line states that in the relative abundance of competing ﬁrms
relative to banks, matching with a banker is inﬁnitely slow.
A.3 Asset values for a banker












Bankers search for a suitable investment at a cost of k and enter the recruiting stage with probability
ftp(ft) during which the vacancy cost g must be disbursed. Meeting a worker occurs at the rate qt, at
which point a banker enters the production stage and the remuneration r is received. An assumption of
free entry for bankers leads k
ftp(ft) = Bl;t,
A.4 Time invariant credit market tightness
Free entry on both sides of the credit market, along with Nash bargaining over the surplus of a credit





; and El;t =
e
p(ft)
Denoting the banker’s bargaining weight by b, and deﬁning the credit relationship surplus as SC;t =










26A.5 Deriving a job creation condition:
It will be convenient at this stage to express the joint value of recruiting a worker to banker and en-



















Deﬁne total costs on the credit market as K(f) = e
p(f) + k













Using the Bellman equations for entrepreneur and banker during production to deﬁne [Eg;t +Bg;t] =
Fg;t = yt  wt +(1 s) 1
1+rEt [Fg;t+1]; we obtain a job creation condition in the presence of frictional












Note that when the credit market is perfect K(f) = 0 and Gt = g, such that the job creation condition













This section provides the details in deriving the rental rate








Deﬁne the surplus to the credit relationship as SC;t = El;t +Bl;t. The sharing rule under Nash bar-


















































Since Bl;t = b [El;t +Bl;t], EtBg;t+1 = (1 b)
g(1+r)
qt +bEt [Eg;t+1+Bg;t+1], or






























A.7 Workers and wages
An individual may be unemployed and with a ﬂow value of non-employment z < y. The unemployed
meet job offers at rate f(q) = qq. Once employed, workers earn wage w until separation, which occurs









We assume that the wage is negotiated between a worker-ﬁrm pair, with surplus SL;t =Fg;t+Wt Ut;
and satisﬁes the sharing rule aFg;t = (1 a)(Wt  Ut), where Fg;t = Eg;t +Bg;t is the joint value of the
28ﬁrm to the entrepreneur-banker pair and a 2 (0;1) is the relative Nash bargaining weight of workers.
Applying this sharing rule to the worker-ﬁrm surplus, ﬁrst we have







































Rearranging terms yield the wage rule under frictional labor and credit markets:
wt = a(yt +qtGt)+(1 a)z
B Deriving the elasticity of market tightness to a productivity shock
B.1 Canonical framework
We assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, such that q(qt) = cq
 h
t , and deﬁne period
proﬁt ﬂows as P = y w. Taking log-linear deviations of the job creation condition (18) around a
stationary steady state, yields a relationship between current and future deviations of labor market tight-




t =PEt b Pt+1+h
g(1 s)
q(qP) Etb qP
t+1. Making use of a forward






hg(1+r)Et b Pt+1 and can express current de-














29a forward looking expression, discounting future deviations of proﬁts. Using the deﬁnition of the wage
wt = a(yt +gqt)+(1 a)z we can further express the deviations of labor market tightness as a dis-
















h(1+r) . Assuming that productivity follows an AR(1) with persistence parameter

























hg (1+r) g [h(1 s) a f(q)]ry
(26)
As a note, if ry = 1, this expression correspond to the elasticity obtained when comparing steady states,







B.2 Frictional credit markets - ﬁxed wage















and, again, q(qt) = cq
 h
t . Taking the log-linear deviations around



















with g(0) = g, then making use of the forward operator,

1  1 s
1+rEtL 1 b qt =
q(q)
hg(r)(1+r)Etb yt+1, and we can express the current deviations of labor market tightness as the discounted
































and the expression for the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks under frictional







B.3 Frictional credit markets -ﬂexible wage














The following preparatory steps are useful in deriving the elasticity of labor market tightness to produc-
tivity shocks in the model with credit frictions and a ﬂexible wage. First, recall that Gt =g(r)+ K
1+rq(qt)
such that the job creation condition is expressed as a function of labor market tightness and productivity.
Then, we take the log-linear deviations of the job creation condition around a stationary steady state:
h(1+r)
q(q)








































for the moment, we then follow similar






























31where e k  K
q(q)
1+r .
32On-line Technical Appendix : Convergence through the
trembling hand calibration method
not for publication
C Convergence with endogenous wages
C.1 Step 1 - getting the right value for the share of the ﬁnancial sector S = 3:0%
We detail the results of the ﬁrst step, matching the share of credit markets in aggregate value added
of S = 3:0%, starting with the value of the objective and the credit market parameters b and e at each
iteration. As during the ﬁrst step when the wage was ﬁxed, matching the size of ﬁnancial markets occurs
by increasing the value of the the bank’s bargaining weight b, while the elasticity of the credit matching
function e remains relatively constant.





































































β − Share of banks in bargaining
ε − elasticity of credit matching function
Figure 1: Step 1 - Credit market share of value added and parameters b and e over j iterations
The next ﬁgure reports the progress of the remaining parameters, the ﬁrst panel plotting the level
parameter in the labor matching function which stabilizes around 0.4. In the second panel shows that
the remaining credit market parameters remain virtually unchanged from their initial values, nor does
the unit cost of job vacancies. The most noticeable change takes place in the relative bargaining weight
of the worker in wage negotiations.











χ − level in labor matching function












γ − vacancy posting cost
e − Entrep. search cost
κ − Bank search cost
ζ − level in credit matching function
α − worker bargaining weight
Figure 2: Step 1 - Progression of remaining parameters during process
C.2 Step 2 - getting the right value for the elasticity of tightness with respect to produc-
tivity shocks
The second step begins with the parameter values obtained and the end of Step 1, adding perturbations
to the value of non-employment, z. At each iteration we choose the set of parameters that obtain the
highest elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks, while satisfying our set of constraints.
The ﬁrst panel of the next ﬁgure presents the progress of the objective at each iteration, and the second
the progression of the parameters b; e and the measure of credit market tightness f.























































 φ − credit market tightness
β − banker bargaining weight
ε − credit matching elasticity
Figure 3: Step 2 - Progression of target and credit market parameters
The next ﬁgure plots the progress of the remaining parameter, in particular z. In this second step the
level parameter in the matching function increases in step with the value of non-employment in order to
respect the constraint of an equilibrium rate of unemployment below 8%. The unit cost of job vacancies
34remains relatively constant. The cost of prospecting on the credit market declines somewhat but remain
symmetrical for banker and entrepreneur. Lastly, there is a slight rise in the level parameter of the credit
matching function. Finally, we constraint the bargaining weight to a  0:1.














γ − vacancy posting cost
e − Entrep. search cost
κ − Bank search cost
ζ − level in credit matching function
α − worker bargaining weight










χ − level in labor matching function
z − −value of non−market activities
Figure 4: Step 2 - remaining parameters over process
35